We study the effects of the 2007-2009 recession on the population age 55 and older. Households in and near retirement have suffered sizeable losses in assets as a result of the economic crisis. There are a number of ways in which households might respond: reduce spending and with that increase saving, work longer, and/or bequeath less. Using longitudinal data from the Health and Retirement Study and its supplemental surveys, we find that all of these adjustments have been important.
Introduction
The Financial Crisis that unfolded so rapidly in the latter part of 2008 developed into a recession that stands out from other recessions of the post-World War II era in several important ways. First, and above all, the size of the swings in the economic environment were unequalled since the Great Depression. Second, the crisis has affected several markets simultaneously (housing, stock and labor market), consequently providing a number of channels through which individuals and their households might be affected.
The economic crisis and the subsequent increase in the unemployment rate have operated through several channels in ways that have affected people of different ages in differing ways. The post-retirement population is vulnerable to negative shocks in the stock and housing markets because of their asset positions, and somewhat less obviously because of linkages to their children. But they are relatively unaffected by unemployment. Furthermore, because of the importance of Social Security in the lower part of the income distribution, many of the less-well-off older households have been unaffected. The older pre-retirement population has also accumulated stocks, and because of the transition from DB to DC pensions, their sources of retirement income security are subject to risk. In addition, because of relatively high rates of labor force participation, they are vulnerable to unemployment: If they lose a job, they have little time to recover from those losses. In contrast to the retired population, those at the lower end of the income distribution are particularly vulnerable to unemployment. A broad generalization is that the effects of the economic crisis are widespread, affecting individuals from all parts of the income distribution. But it would seem that the retired population is actually likely to have suffered less than the pre-retired population.
The aim of this paper is to study the effects of the financial crisis on the population age 51 or older. We use longitudinal data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a household data set that has observations from the time before the economic crisis began until it was well underway, with the latest available data point in
2009.
The housing market, after appreciating for some time, reached its maximum in 
Data
The data for this study come from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). We use data from the 2006 and 2008 core surveys, as well as from two supplemental studies, the Consumption and Activities Mail Survey (CAMS) and the HRS Internet Study. The HRS is a biennial panel. Its first wave was conducted in 1992, with the target population the cohorts born between 1931 and 1941 (Juster and Suzman, 1995) . Additional cohorts were added in 1993 and 1998, so that in 2000, the HRS represented the section of the population from the cohorts of 1947 or earlier. In 2004, new cohorts were again added, making the HRS representative of the population age 51 or older.
CAMS
In September 2001, CAMS wave 1 was mailed to 5,000 households selected at random from households that had participated in HRS 2000. In couples households, it was sent to one of the two spouses at random. The fact that the CAMS sample was drawn directly from the HRS 2000 sample offered an important advantage: It allowed the CAMS data to be linked to the vast amount of information collected in prior waves of the HRS on the individuals and households who had been participating in the core survey. In
HRS Internet Survey
The 2009 HRS Internet survey is the third wave in a series of Internet surveys of a subset of HRS respondents. Eligibility to participate in the 2009 wave was determined by whether, in the core HRS survey in 2008, a respondent reported regularly using the Internet. About 7,000 respondents qualified. 5 The resulting sample tends to overrepresent those with higher education, but this bias is less strong for those age 65 or younger in the HRS. For this age group, Internet usage is more common throughout the distribution of both education and wealth. We have rich background information from the HRS core survey for those who did not participate in the HRS Internet Survey. This information can be used to re-weight any results from the Internet Survey. The field 1 CAMS 2005 included, in addition, a sub-sample of the newly added cohort of the Early Baby-Boomers that was first recruited into the HRS sample as part of the HRS 2004 core survey. 2 See Hurd and Rohwedder (2006) . 3 The CEX collects the most detailed and comprehensive information on total spending by households. 4 When compared with after-tax income in the HRS, the lower levels of spending in CEX imply that single persons accumulate wealth, whereas in panel, they decumulate wealth (Hurd and Rohwedder, 2009) . 5 The unit response rate in the first two HRS Internet Surveys (conditional on being invited to participate) was 70%. 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009 , CAMS waves 2-5 were sent to these same 5,000
households. 1 To facilitate panel analysis, the structure of the questionnaire was almost the same in each of these waves. In this paper, we use CAMS data from all five waves.
CAMS asked respondents about their spending in each of 32 categories. This elicits almost the totality of spending according to the Consumer Expenditure Survey.
The rates of item nonresponse were small. Some values could be imputed to zero with considerable confidence, due to the information in the linked HRS core data. For example, some homeowners (as recorded in the HRS core) did not report a value in CAMS for "rent"; we imputed rent of $0 for these cases. 2 The resulting spending levels are close to totals from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) for the age groups 55-
74.
3 CAMS shows higher levels of spending than the CEX among those age 75 or over.
There is no obvious reason that this difference should show in this age group, but not in the younger age group. However, we believe that the higher CAMS totals are more accurate than those in the CEX because they better match observed rates of wealth decumulation at older ages. we use responses about the crisis's economic effects. We discuss the detailed items for analysis below, but broadly our approach is to find within-person changes in important outcomes that have resulted from the crisis.
Effects of the Crisis on the Economic Circumstances of HRS households
A broad gauge of the scale of the impact of the economic crisis is the simple response to a question about whether a respondent has been affected. About 28% of respondents report that they have been affected a lot, about 46% say they have been affected a little, and just 26% report not having been affected.
Effects on Consumption
According to the standard economic model, consumption is a better measure of economic well-being than income or wealth. We expect that households reduced consumption in response to the crisis. The HRS Internet survey asked respondents how their spending compared with a year earlier. In May 2008, prices in the housing market had begun to decline, but the stock market was still at a relatively high level; the large declines in stocks began later in the year. Unemployment was at 5.4%, although it had been increasing. Accordingly, from the typical household's point of view, the economic crisis was still in the future. In normal times, we would expect that for the younger age groups, spending would increase over a year. Indeed, that is what we observe in cross-section spending data.
However, among respondents in their 50s, more than 30% said their spending had decreased, whereas about 15% said it had increased. At post-retirement ages, however, the pattern reverses, which is a first indicator that the older population was better protected from the effects of the crisis.
The Internet survey contained follow-up questions to assess more directly the importance of various reasons for any changes in spending for respondents who reported having lowered their spending. Table 2 shows the percent that stated that a stated reason for reducing spending was very important or somewhat important. Averaged over all ages, 85% of respondents indicated that being worried about the economic future was an important factor. Although the differences by age are not large, in the oldest age group that percentage was somewhat lower.
There is considerable disagreement in the literature about whether households change their spending in response to movements in asset prices such as stocks or housing.
About half of respondents who had decreased spending attributed their actions to declines in asset prices (stocks and housing). With regard to the other reasons, there is a clear age gradient: The older population is less likely to have reduced spending because of the need to reduce debt, having a lower income, or rising unemployment levels.
In a similar manner, the Internet survey asked those respondents who said their spending had increased for the importance of various reasons. Broadly speaking, spending could increase due to greater economic resources (a positive reason) or due to need (possibly a negative reason). Table 3 shows the distribution of responses among those who said spending had increased. Almost all respondents cited increased spending needs. About half of the respondents were optimistic about their economic future-in sharp contrast with those who had reduced spending (Table 2) . It is notable, however, that among those age 55-64, fewer had increased spending because of optimism. Because just 15% of this group had increased their spending (Table 1) , the fraction of the total age 55-64 population that spent more because of optimism is only about 6%.
About 1/3 of the 55-64 year olds cited better employment as a reason for increasing spending, compared with a negligible percentage in the oldest age group, those age 75 or older, who are mostly already retired. About 30% of those 55-64 attributed more spending to higher mortgage payments. This is in line with an increase in average housing debt (which we will examine directly below), and possibly with balloon mortgages that were a frequent financing instrument during the housing-market bubble.
All of these changes in consumption observed in the Internet survey are selfassessed. While a respondent may have good qualitative knowledge of the changes he or 6 These are derived from the ratios of mean and median spending. The mean of household-level spending change is not a good indicator of population spending change because observation error causes bias in the ratio. 2001-2003, 2003-2005, and 2005-2007 ) so as to smooth out noise in the data and average out other macro shocks. We disaggregate by age band because the older population may have been better protected, as suggested by the self-assessed differences in changes in spending shown in Table 1 . Table 4 shows the changes in mean and median spending both in total and in nondurables, adjusted for price change. 6 Among those age 50-64, mean total spending declined by about 2.1% every two years, averaged over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . This reduction is likely due to a number of reasons, such as changes in household composition or parental support for children's education. 7 The decline in mean nondurable spending among this age group was about 1.0% per two-year period. Among those age 65 or older, the reductions were much greater: 6.3% in mean total spending and 4.9% in mean nondurable spending. These reductions are likely life-cycle effects. During the economic crisis, consumption fell at a much greater rate-almost 10% in the younger age group and 9% in the older. The levels and changes in the medians are smaller, but the patterns are the same.
We summarize and compare the two age groups in family bought at the top of the market with a small percentage down-payment and a balloon loan, that family would now find itself with substantial negative home equity and increased mortgage costs that it might not be able to afford.
The HRS asks respondents about the value of their houses, both in the core survey and the Internet study. These data have the advantages of being reports on the same house over time and being nationally representative. Other commonly used data sources are based on recent actual property sales (possibly including refinanced properties) or in the Case-Shiller index, confined to 20 large cities.
Over several waves of the HRS, the rate of homeownership (assessed in panel)
has been constant at almost 90%. Table 6 Table 7 anyone with an imputed value because we want to report the fraction of households with negative housing equity: The imputation of a value even within a bracket could falsely classify some as having more mortgage than house value.
A comparison of Table 7 with Table 6 shows that excluding respondents who reported incompletely does not materially affect the conclusions we make about the trends in home value and housing debt on average. 10 The homeowners had negative equity and 6.7% of those with a mortgage had negative equity.
House price expectations
As reported in Table 2 , an important reason for a reduction in spending was worries about the economic future. We assess one component of expectations about the 9 In defining the sample we do not allow any imputed information on home ownership, nor on whether the household has any mortgage or other home loans. 10 Note that median housing debt shows a decline in Table 7 between 2006 and later years, which we do not observe in Table 6 . We place more weight on the evidence in Table 6 which is based on a larger sample (not excluding incomplete reports for amounts). 11 These percentages of homeowners with negative equity are more representative of the population than those obtained from sources such as lenders or property records which are either incomplete or outdated. In follow-up questions, respondents were asked about additional price targets, such as an increase in value of 10 or 20% or a decrease in value of 10 or 20%. Respondents were also asked the same question with a time horizon of five years. Table 8 shows the average of those subjective probabilities. The average subjective probability that respondents' houses would be worth more in a year than they are today is just 32%. This indicates that individuals are very pessimistic about the housing market, and these expectations are very much different from historical frequencies of house price gains. In 88% of one-year intervals between 1991 and 2009, housing prices increased. 12 Individuals are somewhat more optimistic over the five-year horizon: There the average subjective probability is about 54%. But the discrepancy with the historical record is even greater, as in every five-year interval between 1991 and 2009 housing prices increased. 13 Most likely, such pessimistic expectations are a partial explanation for the decline in spending reported in Tables 1 and 4 .
Stock market expectations
Using the same format as for house price expectations, respondents are asked about the chances the stock market will be higher in a year. This question was asked in 
Subjective Bequest Probabilities
Using the same format as for the subjective probabilities of housing price gain and stock market price gain, HRS asked respondents about the probability they will leave a bequest greater than $10,000. If this reported probability is positive, the question is repeated with a target of $100,000 and then with a target of $500,000. In cross-section, these subjective bequest probabilities vary positively with wealth, which increases our confidence that they are predictive of actual bequests. We expect some of the losses of assets between 2008 and 2009 will result in lower bequests as well as lower consumption. Table 9 shows the implied distribution of probability mass in the population in each of the wealth intervals. Averaging over all responses, the probability of a bequest less than $10,000 was 16.2 percent and the probability of a bequest between $10,000 and $100,000 was 19.8 percent. It is clear that between 2008 and 2009, the probability mass shifted toward the lower wealth bands, reflecting the loss of wealth.
We calculate expected bequests by multiplying the expected bequest within a wealth band by the probability of a bequest in that interval and then summing over all intervals. The expected bequest within an interval is calculated from the observed distribution of wealth in that interval in the 2008 HRS. The average wealth in the interval 0 to $10,000 was $1,808, and the expected contribution to bequests from that interval was $292. Summing over all intervals, we find that expected bequests declined from $536 thousand in 2008 to $436 thousand in the HRS Internet survey. Of course this reduction is entirely dominated by the top interval, which is a result of the highly skewed distribution of wealth.
Effects on Retirement
The interval between the HRS 2008 interview and the 2009 Internet interview was too short to observe many actual retirements. However, over many waves, HRS has asked workers about retirement expectations (in the form of the subjective probability of working past age 62 and age 65). We call these subjective probabilities P62 and P65.
They are predictive of actual retirement (Hurd, Reti and Rohwedder, 2009 ) and they have an advantage over data on actual retirement because changes in the subjective probability control for individual fixed effects, such as unmeasured permanent taste differences.
Such fixed effects are difficult to control for when using data on actual retirement.
We expect that the financial crisis would have had two opposing effects on retirement. The declines in stock and possibly housing values should have delayed retirement because of the unexpected loss of wealth. Yet the worsening of the labor market and increased risk of unemployment should have led to earlier expected retirement because the older population often has more difficulty finding a job after a period of not working. The net effect is an empirical matter. Table 10 shows averages of P62 for the population of workers in HRS 2008 who were respondents in the Internet interview. 14 The average increased from 58.2% to 61.7%. This is a large increase over a short time period-a little more than a year for some respondents; less than six months for others. To put that change in perspective, the labor force participation rate of the older population has been increasing during the 1990s and particularly in the 2000s: In 2003 the rate among those 60-64 was 51%, and was 54.1% in 2008. The increase over five years was 3.1 percentage points, about the same as the increase in P62 over six to 12 months. If the future actual labor force participation is well-predicted by P62, these data suggest an acceleration of the trend toward higher participation.
We note, however, that the stock market reached its low in March 2009-just a month before the HRS Internet survey was initially fielded. Since then, it has recouped some of its earlier losses, so possibly some of the negative effect of the stock market on wealth has dissipated. Also, the unemployment rate today is slightly higher than during the Internet survey. But most importantly, any expectations among respondents at the time of the survey that the unemployment rate would recover quickly were not realized. Table 11 has similar statistics, but with respect to working past age 65.
Qualitatively we find the same patterns as for P62: an overall increase in P65, which is The levels of P65 in 2008 were much more comparable (just a 6 percentage point difference for P65 compared to a 16 percentage point difference in P62).
Conclusions
In this house and stock prices would recover any time soon (i.e., over the next year). Both actual losses and pessimism led many households to reduce spending. But this trend was less pronounced among households age 65 and older-likely because this age group tends to have more home equity, and Social Security, an important part of its income, was unaffected by the economic downturn. This is in contrast to younger groups in our sample, who still rely on income from earnings. With wealth positions substantially reduced, it may be that households will pass on less wealth to the next generation.
According to respondents' subjective beliefs, this will be the case and the reductions may be sizeable (about 20 percent on average). The median household will not see much change, because the effect is concentrated among households with high wealth.
The past 20 years have witnessed an increase in labor force participation among the older population. On the one hand, the economic crisis has lead to increased unemployment among older workers, causing some earlier-than-anticipated retirement.
But at the same time, workers expect to be working longer, compared with before the crisis. Overall, the economic downturn appears to have accelerated the trend of increases in labor force participation seen over the past 20 years. For the Social Security and Medicare programs, this accelerated trend will relieve some of the financial pressures they now face. Both programs will benefit from additional tax revenues when people work longer. Only Social Security will have to pay out higher benefits in return, but these will amount to less than the additional revenues. If anything Medicare benefit payments may be lower due to some workers having employer-based health insurance, in which case Medicare is the second payer.
In sum, the economic crisis has caused households in and near retirement to suffer sizeable losses in assets. These households responded in several ways: they reduced spending and with that increased saving, they intend to work longer, and anticipate to bequeath less. Note: Average for "all" is not equal to the weighted average of "working" and "not working" when the weights are the sample sizes. The average for "all" uses the HRS person weight adjusted for the Internet interview. Note: Average for "all" is not equal to the weighted average of "working" and "not working" when the weights are the sample sizes. The average for "all" uses the HRS person weight adjusted for the Internet interview. 
